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Three major building blocks of the analysis of a country’s monetary policy are 
the reaction  function  of  the central  bank, or the ultimate  targets of  policy; 
short-run monetary control; and the transmission mechanism. Japanese mon- 
etary policy has been unique in all three aspects. This paper analyzes the spe- 
cial features of the second and third of these building blocks of Japanese mon- 
etary policy, but not the first. That is, it discusses the daily monetary control 
of interest rates and the mechanism by  which interest rate changes affect the 
real economy, but does not address the question of what causes a change in 
policy instruments. 
In my analysis of short-run monetary control and the transmission mecha- 
nism, I try to relate the discussion, to a maximum extent, to current research 
on the same topics in the United States. A perspective relevant for both aspects 
is that Japanese monetary policy has been moving very rapidly over the past 
few years from old-fashioned direct control through moral suasion of interest 
rates and quantities of transactions  to one with heavier reliance on the price 
mechanism in money and capital markets.  In this sense, the present study is 
in line with previous studies on Japanese money and financial markets, such 
as Suzuki (1980), Feldman (1986), and Cargill and Royama (1988), but  it 
adds to the literature by providing  a more rigorous statistical analysis of the 
Japanese interest rate and money-supply  data and by discussing more care- 
fully institutional aspects of  the Bank of  Japan’s short-run monetary control 
process. 
The Federal Reserve (henceforth  the Fed) has alternated between control- 
ling the federal funds rate and bank reserves.  The funds rate volatility was 
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much higher during 1979-82-the  period of bank reserve control. In either 
case, the Fed uses open-market operations  to hit  its target.  Operations  are 
“defensive” ones in which the Fed accommodates short-run temporary fluc- 
tuations in the demand for high-powered money, and “dynamic” ones directed 
toward changing the level of the target.’ 
Has the Bank of  Japan (BOJ) controlled bank reserves? How stable is the 
call rate relative to the funds rate? How important are “defensive” and “dy- 
namic” operations? What are the instruments available to the BOJ for control- 
ling the call rate or bank reserves? These are the major questions I address in 
my comparative analysis of Japanese monetary control. 
I argue that the BOJ, in its daily operations, has long targeted the call rate 
and other interbank rates. It has never targeted bank reserves in the sense of 
setting  target  growth  ranges  for reserves  and reaching  them  within  a  short 
period of time such as a few months. I show this first by presenting evidence 
of  the stability of  interbank  rates  in  Japan relative to the United  States and 
then by pointing out the importance of “defensive” operations by the BOJ in 
stabilizing interbank rates. 
An  important consequence of  interbank rate targeting in Japan is that the 
stock of high-powered  money has been an endogenous variable. That is, the 
BOJ has been accommodating fluctuations in the demand for high-powered 
money at target levels of interbank rates. 
Another feature of Japanese monetary  policy is that for both  “defensive” 
and “dynamic”  operations the BOJ  uses changes in lending at the discount 
window very extensively. That is, discount  window lending is an important 
daily instrufnent for the BOJ. This differs from the role of borrowing from the 
Fed, which moves more or less passively in response to the requests of com- 
mercial  banks. The difference results  from the  absence of  large-scale open 
markets in Japan. 
An important question discussed in the literature is whether the call rate has 
been at the correct level to clear the market for high-powered money. I do not 
offer a definitive answer. But I supply casual evidence pointing to the impor- 
tance of  more direct  control, possibly  through  moral  suasion, of  interbank 
rates by the BOJ, at least for certain subperiods of the postwar period. I dis- 
cuss in  a related  context the new  operating  procedure  introduced  in  1988, 
which has allowed less restricted movement of  interest rates and funds. 
In section  1.2 of the paper, I look at the transmission mechanism of Japa- 
nese monetary poiicy. The analysis is again related to current research on the 
topic  in the United  States. The controversy  between  the credit  and money 
views of the transmission  mechanism is receiving renewed interest in the re- 
cent literature, although conclusive evidence has yet to be offered. The topic 
is even more interesting in Japan because of the availability of a unique policy 
instrument, window guidance, by which bank loans are directly controlled by 
1. See, for example, Roosa (1956) for “defensive” and “dynamic” operations. 9  A Comparative Perspective on Japanese Monetary Policy 
the BOJ. Hence, loans may be important not only as a channel of policy trans- 
mission but also as an instrument of policy. 
I  apply techniques  used  in the recent U.S. literature to analyze Japanese 
data. I find two important conclusions. First, the results of time series analysis 
of Japanese data involving monetary aggregates are extremely sensitive to the 
choice of prefiltering  technique.  Hence, robust results are rather hard to ob- 
tain. Second, despite the sensitivity to the methods used, I find support for 
the importance of loans in the transmission mechanism of Japanese monetary 
policy. 
I also find that both the call rate and bank loans cause other monetary indi- 
cators in the Granger sense. Hence, we might characterize the behavior of the 
BOJ as using both the call rate and window guidance to move bank loans and 
other interest rates, which in turn change other monetary aggregates and real 
variables of the economy. 
The BOJ announced in June 1991 that it would discontinue its use of win- 
dow guidance.  Perhaps this was part of  the new strategy of  the BOJ to rely 
more heavily on the price mechanism in money and capital markets for carry- 
ing out monetary policy. Whether such moves will be permanent and whether 
they will be successful has yet to be determined. 
Section 1.1 starts with a brief summary of the Fed’s operating procedure. I 
then compare it with the BOJ’s operations. Detailed analysis of the behavior 
of  interest  rates and bank reserves  is presented.  I  turn to the analysis of  the 
transmission  mechanism of Japanese monetary policy in section 1.2. I carry 
out time series analysis of monetary indicators, paying particular attention to 
the comparison of  the predictive power of  money  and lending.  Section  1.3 
summarizes the ‘major conclusions of the paper. 
1.1  The Short-Run Monetary Control Technique of the BOJ 
In this section I try to relate the daily operating procedures of the BOJ and 
associated  issues  as much  as possible  to the  procedures  of  U.S.  monetary 
control.  I  briefly  summarize  what  appears to be the consensus view  of  the 
Fed’s operating  procedure  and  then explain  the  operating procedure of the 
BOJ,  highlighting  the  similarities and dissimilarities between  the  operating 
procedures of the two central banks. 
It is important to keep in mind the time unit of analysis. Some of the dis- 
cussion below refers to daily operations of the central banks, some abstracts 
from daily movements and looks at averages over reserve accounting periods, 
and some is not affected by the time unit. 
1.  I.  1  The Operating Procedures of the Federal Reserve 
It will be useful for later purposes to discuss the operating procedures of the 
Fed. The following discussion owes much to Federal Reserve Bank of  New 10  KazuoUeda 
York  (1981,  1988), Kanzaki  (1988),  and  Partlan,  Hamdani,  and  Camilli 
(I  986). 
A convenient starting point is the balance sheet of the Fed, shown in table 
1.1. From the equality of total assets and liabilities, we have 
(1)  S = R  + VC + CU + DG -  (BL + FL + NA), 
where S is security holdings, R  is member-bank  deposits, VC is vault cash, 
CU is currency held by the public, DG is treasury deposits, BL is discount 
window lending, FL is float, and NA is other net assets. This can be rewrit- 
ten as 
(2)  S  = (TR -  BL) + RF = NBR + RF, 
where TR is total reserves defined as R  + VC;  RF is reserve factors, which is 
the sum of all the other items on the righthand side of (1); and NBR is nonbor- 
rowed reserves. By taking  the first difference  of  (2),  we obtain an  identity 
involving open-market operations, OMO: 
(3)  OM0 = d(TR -  BL) + d(RF) = d(NBR) + d(RF), 
where d(x)  indicates the first difference of x. 
The Fed derives its objective for NBR or d(NBR)  by estimating the demand 
for  required  and excess reserves  consistent with  medium-term  targets  for 
monetary aggregates, and then subtracting the estimate of the level of discount 
window borrowing. This sets the “dynamic”  objectives of the Federal Open 
Market Committee-the  first part of the righthand  side of (3), with d(NBR) 
equal to its targets. The second term, d(RF),  in addition to being volatile and 
uncertain, is believed by many central bankers to be beyond their control in 
the very short run, for example, at the daily level. Therefore, it would be best 
to estimate as precisely  as possible  the  fluctuations  in  RF  and  offset them 
using open-market operations in order to avoid unnecessary volatility in short- 
term interest rates.* This is the so-called defensive part of open-market oper- 
ations. 
Most observers of the Fed’s operating procedures suggest that borrowing at 
the discount  window  is not  rationed  even  if  the discount rate is below  the 
federal funds rate. Member banks pay surveillance costs, which are increasing 
in the amount of discount window borrowing. Hence, rational behavior on the 
part of member banks suggests that BL is determined at a finite level and is 
increasing  in the difference between  the federal funds rate and the discount 
rate. 
Assuming that total reserves are a decreasing function of  the federal funds 
rate, equation (3) gives the equilibrium condition of  the federal funds market. 
2. The reason for central bankers’ aversion to interest-rate volatility is a question yet to be 
answered in the literature. But it has played a major role in the daily operations of  many central 
banks. In the U.S.-Japan context, there is more aversion on the part of  the BOJ, as the following 
analyses reveal. 11  A Comparative Perspective on Japanese Monetary Policy 
Table 1.1  The Fed’s Balance Sheet 
Assets  Liabilities 
BL (discount window lending) 
S  (security holdings) 
FL (float) 
NA (other net assets) 
R (member-bank deposits) 
VC  (vault cash) 
CU (currency held by  the public) 
DG (treasury deposits) 
To the extent that “defensive” operations fail to fully offset changes in reserve 
factors, the Fed will observe unexpected changes in discount window borrow- 
ing.3 The Fed tightens its stance by decreasing the “dynamic” part of  open- 
market operations. This creates a rise in the federal funds rate and increased 
borrowing at the discount window. 
It is widely recognized that the Fed targeted nonborrowed reserves during 
the 1979-82  period and the federal funds rate in other  period^.^ However, the 
difference lies more in emphasis than in substance. Obviously, the Fed cannot 
set targets for reserves on a day-to-day or even month-to-month basis and hit 
them exactly. If this policy were tried, it would create enormous movements 
in  interest  rates  and confusion  in  short-term money  markets. Targeting  re- 
serves  merely  means more frequent  adjustments  of  the  “dynamic”  part  of 
open-market operations in response to the deviations of actual reserves from 
their targets and, consequently, more fluctuations in the federal funds rate than 
in the case of targeting the federal funds rate. 
1.1.2  The BOPS  Operating Procedures 
Let us turn to the description of the BOJ’s operating procedures,  using the 
argument in the previous section as a benchmark. 
Some institutional features of the Japanese money markets and bank regu- 
lations should be noted at the outset. Japanese banks are required to hold re- 
serves as deposits at the BOJ; therefore,  vault cash is not included in the cal- 
culation of legal reserves. The treasury bill (TB) market is not comparable in 
size to that of the United  States. In addition,  the current accounting system 
implies that an operation  in the TB market on a certain day is settled three 
days later. Because of these problems, TB operations are not very useful for 
daily adjustments of bank  reserve^.^ 
3. Spindt and Tarhan (1987) show that discount window borrowing responds in this sense to 
fluctuations in other items. They show for the 1979-82  period that changes in money, which create 
changes in TR, cause discount window borrowing in the Granger sense. 
4.  See Meulendyke (1988) for a more careful, historical review of  the Fed’s operating proce- 
dure. 
5. See Okina’s paper in this volume for a more careful description of  the Japanese short-term 
money markets. The report of  the Committee on Short-Term Money Markets (1990) discusses 
other institutional problems, including the effects of taxation on money markets. 12  KazuoUeda 
Let us reproduce equation (1) for the BOJ, ignoring the float and net assets: 
(4)  BL + S  = R + VC  + CU + DG. 
A favored rearrangement of this equation by the BOJ is 
(5)  d(R) = d(BL) + OM0 -  d(VC + CU + DG). 
Some of the differences between the BOJ’s and the Fed’s operating procedures 
are already apparent.  The Japanese counterpart to d(RF)-technical  reserve 
factors-is  the third term on the righthand  side of  (5),  and unlike (3) it  in- 
cludes vault cash. This is because vault cash cannot be used to meet  legal 
reserve requirements. It also implies that the BOJ regards vault cash as exog- 
enous in the short run. Just as the Fed regards d(RF) in equation (3) as exog- 
enous, the BOJ treats the d(VC + CU  + DG)  term as exogenous in its daily 
operations. 
Another  difference  between  equations  (3) and  (5) is that BL is not  sub- 
tracted from R to arrive at nonborrowed reserves. In fact, the concept of non- 
borrowed reserves has never been used in Japan.6 This reflects the use of dis- 
count window borrowing as a control variable by the BOJ. The discount rate 
has always been lower than the call rate. Therefore, discount window lending 
has been rationed in Japan. And the level of lending has been changed at the 
initiative of  the BOJ, not of  private banks.’  In fact, this has been the major 
policy instrument of  the BOJ, as shown below. 
The BOJ calls the d(VC + CU  + DG) term of equation (5) the shortage 
(or surplus if negative) of funds in the money market. The “defensive” opera- 
tions of the BOJ are directed toward offsetting the effects of changes in  this 
term. The BOJ devotes considerable effort to estimating the shortage of funds. 
Funds are supplied either through the BOJ’s discount window, BL, or by open- 
market operations,  OMO. For “defensive” operations,  both instruments are 
usually used. 
The difference  between  the total  supply  of  funds from the  BOJ  and  the 
amount  of  “defensive”  operations  is accounted  for,  of  course, by  the  “dy- 
namic”  operations of the BOJ,  and this difference determines the change in 
bank reserves. Assuming that the demand for reserves by banks responds to 
the call market rate, we see that equation (5) determines the equilibrium call 
rate. 
1.1.3  Interbank Rate Targeting in Japan 
What has been the target of the BOJ’s operations? As far as I know, the BOJ 
has never targeted bank reserves or high-powered  money.8 In a sense, short- 
6. Interestingly, more than all reserves are borrowed; that is, nonborrowed reserves are negative 
in Japan. In 1990 reserves were about 4.9 trillion yen, while BOJ lending stood at 6.3 trillion yen. 
7. Royama (1971) was one of the first to point this out. Although the situation in which the 
interbank rate is higher than the discount rate is the same in the United States, private banks may 
borrow at their initiative from the Fed in the United States, while this is not the case in Japan. 
8. Many, including Dotsey (1986), Cargill and Royama (1988), and Bryant (1990), have made 
a similar observation. In particular, Dotsey’s work compares the variability of  interest rates be- 13  A Comparative Perspective on Japanese Monetary Policy 
term (month-to-month) control of bank reserves is almost impossible in Japan 
because of the lagged reserve accounting system and the near absence of ex- 
cess  reserve^.^ Since the mid-l970s, the BOJ has paid attention to the behav- 
ior of broader monetary aggregates as intermediate targets of monetary policy. 
However, it seems that it has never used information on monetary aggregates 
to calculate  target levels for bank reserves or interbank rates in a mechani- 
cal way. 
The short-term operating target of  the BOJ has long been interbank interest 
rates. During normal times, when tightening or loosening of monetary policy 
is unnecessary, the BOJ stabilizes interbank rates. A change in the stance of 
monetary policy creates new target levels for interbank rates. New targets are 
almost immediately achieved by “dynamic” operations as explained in section 
1.1.4. The precise  manner in which the BOJ calculates the target  levels of 
interbank rates has never been disclosed. I doubt that it uses any quick for- 
mula to do this. As stated above, it has never targeted bank reserves.  But it 
does pay close attention to the level of the reserve supply relative to required 
reserves on a daily basis in order to achieve interest rate targets. This will be 
explained below. 
I now show more formally that the BOJ has targeted interbank rates. First I 
show that, as a statistical matter, the call rate has been much more stable than 
the federal  funds rate. Second I  argue that the stability of  the call rate is a 
result of the “defensive” operations of the BOJ rather than a result of the sta- 
bility or high interest rate elasticity of the demand for high-powered money. 
The relative  stability  of  Japanese interbank  rates  is  shown  in  table  1.2, 
where the standard deviations of daily interest rates for the periods since the 
late 1970s are presented for the United States and Japan. Clearly, interest rate 
volatility is higher in the United States. The differences in the standard devia- 
tions between the two countries are significant for all three interest rates on 
the basis of the usual F-test on two variances. 
The difference in the degree of volatility is largest for the interbank rates. 
The volatility of the federal funds rate for the entire period is affected by the 
increased volatility in the 1979-82  period, when the Fed paid more attention 
to the control of reserves. However, the volatility of the call rate is lower than 
that of the federal funds rate even in periods that exclude 1979-82.  The num- 
bers in parentheses are standard deviations calculated  from the sample, ex- 
cluding Wednesday observations. They are presented because the volatility of 
the federal funds rate is much affected by its behavior on the last day of the 
reserve accounting period-Wednesday.  However, the volatility of the federal 
funds rate is still much higher than that of the call rate. Though significant, 
tween Japan and the United States, as I  do in table  1.2, and concludes that in both  countries 
interbank rates are targeted. Because he uses quarterly data, however, he does not find as large a 
difference in interbank rate variability as I do. 
9. For the period 1967-87,  excess reserves were, on average,  1.225% of  required reserves in 
the United States and 0.142% in Japan. It is possible, though, that this near absence of  excess 
reserves is the result of passive accommodation of  reserve demand by the BOJ. 14  KazuoUeda 
~ 
Table 1.2  The Volatility of Daily Interest Rates 
Period  Interbank Ratea  3-Month Rate  Long-Term Rate 
United States 
1977:  1:1-1991:2:11  ,523 (.466)  .221  ,143 
1977:  1: 1-1979: 1017  ,211 (.159)  ,180  ,0581 
1979:  10:8-1982: 10:22  ,841 (.738)  ,402  ,239 
1982:102&1991:2 11  ,437 (.400)  ,111  .I12 
Japan 
1978:l:l-1991:2:14 
l979:5: 1-1988: 10:31 
1978: 1:1-1979:4:30 





.0725  ,121 
,047 
.0801  ,136 
,0254  ,0877 
Notes: Entries are the variance of deviations of each rate from its centered moving average with 
ten observations on each side. The interest rates are: the federal funds rate, TB rate, and  the 
seven-year-bonds rate for the United States and the call rate, the CD rate, and the 10-year-bond 
rate for Japan. 
“Entries  in parentheses are calculated by excluding Wednesday observations. 
Table 1.3  The Volatility of Currency in Circulation 
Japan  United States 
1963-90  1967-90 
Seasonally adjusted data  3.0 * 10-4  7.5 * 10-6 
Unadjusted data  5.6 * lo-’  8.0 * 10-5 
Nore: Entries show the variance of  the monthly rate of  change in currency in circulation. 
the difference in the volatility of long-term rates between the two countries is 
not very large. 
Consequently,  the stability of  Japanese interbank  rates evidenced in table 
1.2 must come from one of three possibilities: the shortage or surplus of funds 
in Japan is more stable than U.S. reserve factors; the interest rate elasticity of 
the demand for high-powered money is higher in Japan; or the BOJ carries out 
more accurate “defensive” operations. 
Table 1.3  shows the variability of currency in circulation, the largest com- 
ponent  of  high-powered  money  in  both  countries.  Unambiguously,  the  de- 
mand for currency by the nonbank public fluctuates more in Japan than in the 
United  States. Okina’s paper  in this volume presents  evidence,  though less 
formally, of the larger volatility of other components of  high-powered money 
in Japan as well. 
Estimates  of  the  interest elasticities  of  the  components  of  high-powered 
money-currency  held  by  the public  and  bank  reserves-are  presented  in 
table 1.4. The specification of the demand functions is the conventional one 
of  partial  adjustment,  in  which  the  righthand  side of  the  demand  function 15  A Comparative Perspective on Japanese Monetary Policy 
Table 1.4  Interest Rate Elasticities of the Components of High-powered Money 
Japan  United States  Activity 
1963-90  1967-90  Variable 
CU (currency in circulation)  -  .0014  -  ,00097  IP 
-  ,0022  -  .000516  C 
TR (total reserves  ,0032  -  ,0013  IP 
including vault cash) 
-.a  *  10-4  -.a  10 -3  RR 
Notes: The equations estimated are, for example, the log of CU regressed on a constant, the call 
(or funds) rate, the log of an activity variable, and the lagged dependent variable. Both CU and 
TR are deflated by the CPI. Entries are short-term (semi-) elasticities. IP = index of production; 
C = sales of department stores deflated by the CPI; RR = required reserves deflated by the CPI. 
includes the lagged dependent variable. The table shows only short-run elas- 
ticities, that is, the response of CU or TR within a month of a change in the 
interest rate. The magnitude of the elasticity of CU is about the same across 
the two countries, but that of reserves is smaller in Japan. 
We have seen no evidence of greater stability or higher interest elasticity in 
the demand for high-powered money in Japan. Consequently, accurate “defen- 
sive” operations by the BOJ must have been the key to achieving stable inter- 
bank interest rates in Japan. A back-of-the-envelope  calculation will help us 
to understand the magnitude of interest-rate fluctuations in the absence of “de- 
fensive” operations. Monthly variations in the RF term can easily come close 
to a few trillion yen. Suppose that the Bank of  Japan did not accommodate 
these and that the elasticity of CU + TR was at most .002 based on table 1.4. 
High-powered  mbney  stands at  about  40 trillion  yen.  One  would  need  to 
change the call rate by close to 100 percentage  points to bring about a few 
trillion yen change in the demand for high-powered money. 
Fortunately, the daily data on the shortage or surplus of  funds and its pre- 
vious day’s expectation, both published  by the BOJ, enable us to check the 
accuracy of “defensive” operations. If they are successful, they would purge 
interest rates of  any systematic response to the shortage or surplus of funds. 
Therefore, I regressed  daily changes in the unconditionalkollateral call rate 
on the shortage or surplus of  funds for the same day, using its forecast of the 
previous day as an instrument. The results are 
d(i<)  = .00713 + ,00690 * d (VC + CU  + DG),  D.W.  = 1.99, 
(.071)  (.080) 
where  i< is the  overnight  call  rate, the  sample is  1990:8:9-1991:1:10,  and 
t-statistics are in parentheses. The equation rejects the existence of any sys- 
tematic effect of  the shortage or surplus of funds on the call rate. The opera- 
tions of  the BOJ must have been accommodating these fluctuations in the de- 
mand for high-powered money.  lo 
10. Bernanke and Blinder (1990) offer similar evidence for the United States, using weekly data 
for the period of funds rate control. 16  KazuoUeda 
To summarize, the BOJ has deliberately  aimed at stabilizing the call rate 
around its target level. To  achieve this, the BOJ has used “defensive” opera- 
tions  extensively.  An  important consequence of  this  policy,  of  course, has 
been that the stock of  high-powered money has been an endogenous variable 
responding to changes in the demand for high-powered money. 
1.1.4  Changing the Target Level of the Call Rate 
Adjustment of the Reserve Progress Ratio 
“Dynamic” operations  are the mechanism by which the BOJ changes the 
target level of the call rate. Toward the end of the 1980s, many new types of 
operations became available to the BOJ, such as operations in TB, financial 
bills, (FB) and commercial paper (CP) markets. However, these markets are 
too small for the BOJ to carry out large-scale operations. Consequently,  the 
BOJ has depended on changes in lending at the discount window and opera- 
tions in the bill market when it carries out “dynamic” operations.’’ 
Table 1.5 presents some regression results highlighting the use of BL as the 
most important instrument of “dynamic” operations. Equation (2) in the table 
explains the (daily average of  the) call rate in any month, using the discount 
rate and the share of BL in high-powered money, both measured at the end of 
the previous month. The regressors are lagged by one month in order to avoid 
biases  stemming from the correlation between  the regressors  and the  error 
term. The estimation result shows that, as more funds are supplied through 
the discount window, the call rate will be lower. Equation (3) shows a similar 
result in first difference form. These results  are at least consistent  with the 
hypothesis’ that a lowering of  interest rates is initiated by an increase in dis- 
count window lending. 
On the other hand, the correlation between the federal funds rate and dis- 
count window borrowing is positive in the United States, as shown in equation 
(1) of the table.  Such a pattern of  correlation will result if open-market oper- 
ations  are used  as the  vehicle  of  monetary  policy  and borrowing  responds 
passively to the resulting movements in the funds rate. 
During periods of  monetary tightening or loosening, the BOJ changes the 
time path of reserve supplies within one reserve accounting period.lz Both the 
BOJ and the market pay attention to the reserve progress ratio, the cumulative 
sum of  actual  daily reserves  since the beginning  of  the current  reserve  ac- 
counting period relative to the required reserves of the period. During normal 
times, this ratio is assumed to start at zero and to increase by about 1/30  every 
day to reach  1 at the end of the period. A “dynamic” initiative by the BOJ to 
tighten (loosen) its stance is reflected in a slowing (quickening) of the pace of 
11. Operations in the bill market are not “open”; that is, the BOJ picks a bank with which it 
12. See, for example, Kanzaki (1988) or Suzuki, Kuroda, and Shirakawa (1988) for a more 
trades bills. In this sense, operations in the bill market are closed to discount window lending. 
detailed description of  this process. 17  A Comparative Perspective on Japanese Monetary Policy 






(I)* 1967:l-1987:12  log(BL/p)  ,257 * i,-  .I71 * id 
(2.19)  (- 1 .oO) 
k  = ,867 
(28.4) 
(2)b 1966:ll-1989:lO  i, 
(3)b  1966:ll-1989:lO  d(i<) 
.792 * id( -  I) - 1.50 * (BL/H)(  -  1) 
,667 * d(iJ -  1)-  .216 * d(log(BL( -  I))  k  = ,0884 
k  = ,949 
(11.2)  (- 2.56)  (55.  I) 
(9.13)  (-3.56)  (I  .46) 
Notes: Constant terms are also included in the equations. Numbers in parentheses are t-statistics. 
BL = borrowings at the central bank; H  = stock of high powered money; i,  = call rate; id = 
discount rate; i,  = federal funds rate; k  = estimated coefficient of the first-order serial correlation 
of the error term; p  = index of CPI. 
‘Equation  (I) is estimated by  Fair’s method using the log of  real nonborrowed reserves as an 
instrument. 
bEquations (2) and (3) use the maximum likelihood method to correct for serial correlation 
the  increase  in this ratio relative  to the  normal  pattern  of  increase.  This is 
accomplished by, for example, a decrease (increase) in BOJ lending. 
When the BOJ  slows the pace of  increase in the reserve progress ratio,  it 
sends a signal of monetary tightening to the market, forcing private banks to 
borrow more funds in the call market and thus achieving the policy objective 
of raising the call rate. 
I  make  one  final  remark  on  the  endogeneity  of  high-powered  money.  I 
pointed out in section  1.1.3 that high-powered  money is endogenous during 
normal times because of  interest  rate targeting.  The above interpretation of 
“dynamic” operations suggests that a process of tightening  is begun by a de- 
crease in the stock of high-powered money. By the end of the reserve account- 
ing period, however,  the  BOJ  will be obliged to supply (because of lagged 
reserve accounting)  a predetermined  amount of  reserves,  albeit at a higher 
interest rate.I3 The total  stock of  high-powered  money  will decrease to the 
13. Many have discussed what would happen if the interest elasticity of high-powered money 
were zero. In  that case, one could argue that the BOJ  may not be able to change the call rate 
because it cannot change the stock of high-powered money. Private banks may just as well wait 
until the BOJ supplies enough reserves, making changes in the reserve progress ratio an ineffective 
tool of monetary control. Suzuki (1980) and Okina (1987 and in this volume) have pointed out the 
high cost of  discount window borrowing close to the end of a reserve accounting period as an 
important vehicle for the control of the call rate. For example, the BOJ may charge two days of 
interest (at the discount rate) for a twenty-four-hour loan from the discount window on the last day 
of the accounting period. In such a case, the daily interest rate is double the usual discount rate 
and easily exceeds the call rate. Market participants point out another form of penalty for private 
banks that do not take enough funds in interbank markets.  (See Ueda and Uekusa  1988.) The 
penalty is the calling off of discount window lending. Since BOJ lending is done at a subsidized 
rate (that is, a rate lower than the call rate),  such banks would lose part of the subsidies they 
receive from the BOJ. The BOJ does not have to impose these penalties all the time. It suffices to 
create the expectation of such a possibility by  using the penalty once in a while. These are inter- 18  KazuoUeda 
extent that a higher interest rate will decrease some other components of the 
demand for high-powered money-for  example, the demand for currency by 
the nonbank  public.  But the amount of the response  is usually very  small. 
Hence, most of the movements in the stock of high-powered money are driven 
by demand-side factors, even in periods when a strong “dynamic” initiative is 
exercised by the BOJ. 
An Alternative View of  Interest Rate Control 
An  alternative explanation of  interest rate control by  the BOJ  is that  the 
BOJ determines the call rate at whatever rate it desires and sometimes forces 
market  participants  to take  undesired  positions.  This  view  has  been  fairly 
strong among market participants  (for example, Asami  1963) and academics 
(for example, Horiuchi and Kato 1989). Of course, direct pegging of the call 
rate by  the BOJ  would  not  be  much  different  from the control  mechanism 
explained in the previous section, if the BOJ accommodated all changes in the 
demand for high-powered  money  at the quoted call  market rate.  However, 
there are reasons to believe that the call market was not in equilibrium at least 
until 1988. 
Direct pegging of the call rate by the BOJ has been achieved by the follow- 
ing mechanism, although the BOJ is not a player in the call market. The BOJ 
has exerted strong influence on the behavior of the call loan dealers (Tanshi 
Gaisha) who act as brokers  and dealers in the call market.  Under the tatene 
system, that is, until  1979, every day after the close of  the market the BOJ 
and a representative call loan dealer met and discussed the next day’s call rate; 
in effect, the BOJ told the dealer the call rate. The rate would be announced 
the morning of  the next day. Under the kehaichi system, between  1979 and 
1988, the role of  the BOJ in the determination  of the call rate wa.s  officially 
weakened but actually remained the same. 
The next question is whether the call rate that had been quoted was clearing 
the market. Anecdotal evidence abounds that it did not. Large city banks have 
been  chronic borrowers  of  funds in the call  market.  Interviews  with  these 
bankers reveal that their daily demand for reserves is interest inelastic. They 
claim that they only take funds supplied by call loan dealers. This would occur 
if the call rate were set by the BOJ at artificially low levels so that the market 
was in a state of  excess demand. On the other hand, suppliers of funds in the 
interbank markets have an incentive to move funds into more flexible markets 
such as Euromarkets. They speak of  informal guidance by  the BOJ  asking 
them not to move large quantities of funds away from the interbank markets. 
Direct transactions  among banks in the call market have been strictly pro- 
esting arguments, but they rely on special features of the current reserve accounting system, such 
as the absence of a carry-over procedure, or on lagged reserve accounting and/or the discount rate 
being lower than the call rate. Moreover, the issue itself disappears if the interest rate elasticity of 
high-powered money is nonzero, as shown in table I .4. 19  A Comparative Perspective on Japanese Monetary Policy 
hibited. Such a regulation  would be necessary  if the call rate quoted by  the 
BOJ was not at the equilibrium level. 
Table  1.6 shows the chronology of  regulations on interbank rates. During 
the years before  1988, the only period in which the BOJ did not quote the call 
rate either directly or indirectly was between August  1955 and June  1957. I 
have calculated the variance of monthly changes in the call rate for each pe- 
riod. Clearly, the variance is much higher for this period than for the others. 
This fact and the anecdotal evidence discussed above raise doubts about the 
explanation that the stability of Japanese interbank rates is the result of  accu- 
rate defensive operations by the BOJ. The call rate may well have been stable 
because it was set by the BOJ and because movements of funds between mar- 
kets were limited by nonmarket forces such as moral suasion. Horiuchi and 
Kato (1989) also present evidence consistent with a similar interpretation of 
the stability of interbank rates. 
The Liberalization of Short-Term Money Markets 
In a sense, the BOJ admitted to such heavy use of moral suasion when it 
introduced a new operating procedure in November 1988. (See BOJ  1990 for 
the details of the new procedure.) In the summer of  1988, short-term rates in 
open markets, such as the CD rate and Euroyen rates, increased as a result of 
an expectation of a future tightening of monetary policy. But the BOJ wanted 
to keep interbank rates at relatively low levels. The difference between inter- 
Table 1.6 
Period’  Regulations’  Varianceb 
Chronology of Regulations on Interbank Rates 
1948: 1-1955~7  The BOJ sets guidance rates for the call rate at 
levels not higher than the maximum indicated 







Guidance rates are abolished. 
Private banks (under the strict guidance of  the 
BOJ) set thejishuku rate. 
Call loan dealers, in consultation with the BOJ, 
set tatene for the call rate daily and announce 
it to market participants. 
Interbank rates are set daily by the BOJ, and 
dealers announce it as kehaichi. 
The new monetary control regime is 
introduced. But the kehaichi system for the 
call transactions with collateral remains until 






“From  Horiuchi and Kato (1989), my translation. 
bThe variance of  monthly changes in the unconditional call rate with collateral. 20  KazuoUeda 
bank and open-market rates widened, as illustrated in figure 1.1, and transac- 
tions shifted to open markets. However, the large gap between the two types 
of rates and the existence of transactions in both markets implies that implicit 
regulations  existed that prohibited  at least part of  the arbitrage between the 
markets. 
In November  1988 the BOJ announced that it would liberalize transactions 
in the interbank markets and arbitrage between open and interbank markets. 
The alleged purpose of  such a policy change was to increase the degree of 
arbitrage between interest rates and to encourage more free determination of 
interbank rates. 
Since then,  the  difference  between  interbank  and  open-market  rates  has 
never been as large as it was in the summer of  1988. In that sense, the new 
procedure has increased arbitrage between markets.  l4  However, the variability 
of  the call rate has not increased, as is shown in table 1.6. Calculations using 
daily data also show that  the volatility of  the call rate has decreased  since 
1988. This is partly  attributable to the decline in the volatility  of long-term 
rates, which is shown in table  1.2. That is, it has been a relatively  calm pe- 
riod.I5  But more research needs to be carried out on this point. 
To summarize the discussion so far, the call rate has been the target of BOJ 
policy for most of the postwar period.  It has been much more stable than the 
federal funds rate. The major reason for the stability has been the extensive 
and accurate use of “defensive” operations by the BOJ. However, the heavily 
used practice of  the BOJ’s directly quoting the call rate, together with moral 
suasions discouraging  arbitrage  between  markets, might also have played  a 
role. 
1.2  The lkansmission Mechanism 
Let us now turn to the analysis of the transmission mechanism of Japanese 
monetary policy, again comparing it with the U.S. transmission mechanism. 
Recent  research  in  the field  has  centered  on the  question  of  the  credit- 
versus-money view of the transmission mechanism of monetary policy. Thus, 
on the one hand Bernanke and Blinder (1990) present evidence for the impor- 
tance of bank loans, while King (1986) and Romer and Romer (1990) argue 
for the importance of bank liabilities.  In addition, Bernanke and Blinder re- 
port the interesting  finding that the federal funds rate is a good indicator of 
monetary policy. That is, the funds rate is markedly superior to various mon- 
14. Even as of early 1991, however,  market participants admit that there is guidance given by 
the BOJ and the Ministry of Finance regarding the proportion of funds participants in the noncol- 
lateral call market relative to the collateral market. 
15. The practice of the BOJ’s setting the call rate indirectly-the  kehaichi-sei-remained  for 
the collateral rate until November 1990. But the difference in the volatility of this rate before and 
after November 1990 is very small. 21  A Comparative Perspective on Japanese Monetary Policy 
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-  3-month  CD rate  +  2-month  Tegata rate 
Fig. 1.1  Tegata (bills discount) rate and CD rate 
etary aggregates and other interest rates as a forecaster of  major macroeco- 
nomic variables. 
The analysis of  the Japanese monetary  transmission  mechanism  is espe- 
cially interesting in the context of  such recent developments. A unique policy 
instrument  available to the BOJ is so-called window guidance, whereby the 
BOJ controls the amount of bank loans directly. This may increase the impor- 
tance of  bank loans in Japan relative to countries in which such an instrument 
is not used. 
The stability of the call rate relative to the federal funds rate, analyzed in 
section 1.1.4, may imply that the call rate is a very good indicator of Japanese 
monetary policy and at the same time a good predictor of macrovariables. The 
predictive power of the call rate in Japan may be higher than that of the federal 
funds rate in the United States. 
Unfortunately, the statistical relationships  between  the call rate and other 
monetary variables or macrovariables are very unstable. Time series analyses 
involving  monetary  aggregates  and other macroeconomic  variables are ex- 
tremely sensitive to the choice of end-of-period versus average-of-period data 
as well as to the way the series are detrended and seasonally adjusted.  It al- 
most seems as if one can come up with any conclusion by choosing different 
ways of prefiltering the data. 
Tables  1.7 and  1.8 show the results of  money-versus-loan  causality  tests 
and a comparison of the predictive powers of various monetary variables. In 22  KazuoUeda 
Table 1.7  Predictive Power of Monetary Indicators in Bivariate Regressions 
with Index of Production 
Seasonal  Dependent 
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Notes: The dependent variable is the log of  the index of  production plus the log of  the CPI. The 
money-supply data are also differenced in the same way. Twelve lags were used for all dependent 
and independent variables. Annual  change indicates the log annual change; FD means the log 
difference; level is the regression including a linear time trend; y indicates significance at the 5% 
level. H  = high-powered money; L  = bank loans; i< = call rate. 
"1 = estimation for 1969:l-1979:4; 2 = estimation for 1979:5-1989:lO. 
bMonthly dummies are included as independent variables. 
table 1.7 the predictive power, in the Granger sense, of  monetary indicators is 
shown in bivariate regressions  involving  the pace of  economic activity (the 
log of the index of production plus that of the CPI) and one of the indicators. 
The data are monthly,  and twelve lags of each variable were included in the 
regression. 
As warned above, the results are amazingly  sensitive to small changes in 
the data or the specification.  Thus, it would be better to use seasonally ad- 
justed data in order to find strong effects of monetary indicators, and better to 
use nonadjusted, end-of-month data in level form with a time trend in order to 
support perhaps the real business cycle theory. The use of  monthly averages 
of  daily data implies strong effects for indicators in the 1970s; end-of-period 
data imply strong effects in the 1980s. Money supply measures (M, and M,) 
appear to exert strong effects on the economy, in terms of the number of times 
they are significant in the table, as does the call rate. 
In table 1.8 I carry out an exercise similar to the one performed by  Ber- 
nanke and Blinder (1990). When more than one indicator was significant in 
table 1.7, I included all the indicators in the regression to compare the predic- 23  A Comparative Perspective on Japanese Monetary Policy 
Table 1.8  Marginal Significance Levels of Monetary Indicators for Forecasting 
the Index of Production 
Seasonal  Dependent 
Data  Adjustment  Variable  H  M,  M,  L  i<  Period' 
~ 
Average  Y  level  .012  ,093  ,212  ,120  ,165  I 
,008  ,103  ,009  ,012  ,030  2 
Average  annual  ,147  ,045  .242  .646  ,564  1 
** 
** 
change  *  * 
End of  period  Y  level  ,010  ,010  ,011  .795  ,002  I 
*  * 
End of period 
,467  ,115  ,009  ,030  .021  2 
annual  .501  .097  ,011  ,277  ,116  2 
change  *  * 
Notes:  Regressions in this table include twelve lags of all the monetary indicators.  Results are 
shown only for those cases in which more than one indicator was significant in table  I .7 and at 
least one indicator was significant when all indicators were included. * means the indicator had 
the highest explanatory power in terms of  variance decomposition either in the order appearing 
in the table or in the reverse order; ** means the indicator had the highest explanatory power in 
both decompositions. Annual change indicates the log annual change; FD means the log differ- 
ence; level is the regression including a linear time trend; y indicates significance at the 5% level. 
H  = high-powered money; L  = bank loans; i(  = call rate. 
'1  = estimation for 1969:l-1979:4:  2 = estimation for 1979:5-1989:lO. 
tive power of  each more accurately. In contrast to the finding of Bernanke and 
Blinder that the federal funds rate is unambiguously the best indicator. I find 
mixed results. None seems to be markedly superior to the others. 
The results of the variance decomposition shown in the table, however, are 
less ambiguous. Even with reordering  of equations, bank loans possess  the 
highest explanatory power in 80% of the cases. This result is, at least, sugges- 
tive of the importance of  bank loans in the Japanese monetary transmission 
mechanism. In other words, bank loans affect the real economy through their 
effects on other indicators such as monetary aggregates, and this accounts for 
their predictive power in the Granger sense. 
Such an interpretation is broadly consistent with the perception of  the staff 
of  the  BOJ and of  market  participants  about  the transmission  mechanism. 
Their perception  is conveniently  summarized  in a flowchart (fig.  1.2) used 
occasionally by the BOJ. In the middle of the chart we see that the call rate is 
the most important direct target (or instrument) of policy, and it is controlled 
mainly by BOJ lending, open-market operations, and the discount rate. This 
was discussed in section  1.1. Changes in the call rate cause changes in other 
interest rates, including the loan rate. These changes, together with the effect 
of  window guidance, will affect bank loans and real variables. This has long 
been the established  view of Japanese monetary policy, and it highlights the 
importance of  bank  loans. The chart also includes the direct effects of  the 24  KazuoUeda 
of Money Market Conditions  Discount 
- Direct lendings to banks 
- Sales and purchases of 
of Reserve Deposits 
II 
Interest Rate in Call 
(and Bill) Money Market 
Interest Rates on Other Financial instruments  Lendings  of Financial Institutions 
t 
Money Stock and Other 
Aggregative Financial Variables 
I  -;  Real-Sector Variables, including  I 
i  Ultimate Objectives of Bank of Japan Policy  I 
Fig. 1.2  Schematic diagram of the conduct of Japanese monetary policy 
money  supply and other interest rates on the real  sector, but these have not 
been rega!ded  as the centerpiece of the transmission mechanism. 
Slightly more robust time series evidence than that presented in table 1.7 is 
shown in table  1.9. Here we check  for Granger causality  among monetary 
indicators only, and we find exactly the pattern of causation expected from the 
above discussion. That is, loans and the call rate are not caused by the other 
variables except for minor cases, while these two indicators help predict other 
variables. l6 
One additional  piece  of  evidence  on the  importance  of  loans  is offered, 
using the technique employed by Romer and Romer (1 990). In their study of 
the money-lending-output  correlation they focus on periods when the Fed de- 
liberately shifted to tighter monetary policy. This focus allows them to avoid 
confusion between the effects of  monetary indicators on output and the effects 
working in the reverse direction. 
The dates of deliberate shift to tighter monetary policy are easy to identify 
in Japan. Most people assume that a change in the discount rate provides such 
information. (Such dates are March 1957, December 1959, July 1961, March 
16. Hutchison (1986) finds causality running from the call rate to M2 in a three-variable system 
of M,, the call rate, and nominal retail sales. But he does not check for the importance of  bank 
loans. 25  A Comparative Perspective on Japanese Monetary Policy 











Notes: Entries indicate significance in the Granger sense in the regression of a row variable on 
the column variables. The upper half  uses the average of daily data, while the lower half uses 
end-of-month data. The sample is 1969:  1-1979:4  for the first half of the paired entry and 1979:5- 
1989:lO for  the second half.  All  regressions included twelve lags of  each variable and  a time 
trend. Monetary  aggregates were seasonally adjusted. H =  high-powered money; L  = bank 
loans; it  = call rate. y  = significance at the 5% level; n  = insignificance. 
1964, September  1967, September  1969, April  1973, April  1979 and May 
1989.) In certain cases window guidance preceded an increase in the discount 
rate. But I do not make adjustments here, in order to preserve the clarity of 
the criterion. 
Essentially, Romer and Romer first calculate the forecast errors of  money 
and bank lending from a regression of each on its own lags immediately after 
the  shifts to tighter monetary policy. The forecast errors (actual minus pre- 
dicted) are, of course, negative because of the sudden  shifts to tightening. 
However, the errors contain two parts: the independent decrease in money or 
lending  and the response of money or lending to output. The latter may be 
large in  magnitude because tighter policy decreases output over time. In the 
second part of their analysis they recalculate the forecast errors from a regres- 
sion of  money or lending on its own lags and output. The larger the forecast 
errors from the second exercise and the smaller the difference between the two 
exercises, the more important that a monetary indicator is in the transmission 
mechanism of monetary policy. Based on such an analysis, they conclude that 
money is more important than lending. 
Figures 1.3 and 1.4 present the results of the same analysis using the Japa- 
nese data. For money I used M2, and bank  loans are the total loans of the 
banking accounts of  all banks-that  is, bank loans do not include loans that 
are backed by money and other trusts of  trust banks. The data are monthly, 
end-of-month,  and not seasonally adjusted.  The regressions run  are money 
(lending) on a constant,  monthly dummies, twelve lags of  money (lending), 
and  in  some cases  the  index of production.  Variables are  in log difference 
form, I show the forecast errors from regressions that do not include output in 26  KazuoUeda 
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Fig. 1.4  Average forecast errors, given actual path of production 27  A Comparative Perspective on Japanese Monetary Policy 
figure 1.3.  The errors move in almost the same way for money as for lending, 
although during the first few months the errors in lending move ahead. (This 
is already somewhat different from the Romer and Romer finding in which the 
errors for lending  are much  larger than, but  initially  lag behind,  those  for 
money.) 
The forecast errors from the regressions involving output, presented in fig- 
ure 1.4, are significantly different between money and lending. Both are much 
smaller in absolute value than in figure 1.3, but more so for money. Moreover, 
the peak in the forecast error occurs after eighteen months for money, but after 
twenty-three months  for lending. The errors from the lending regression to 
monetary tightening respond more quickly than do those from the money re- 
gression, which is more evident in figure 1.4  than in figure 1.3. This is also in 
sharp contrast to Romer and Romer. They find that the error from the lending 
regression does not become significantly negative until after fifteen months of 
tightening. 
The results in figures  1.3 and  1.4 are supportive of  a more important role 
for bank  lending than for money in the transmission mechanism.  Also, they 
are consistent with the interpretation that bank lending itself is an instrument 
of  monetary policy. The results are not sensitive to whether the data are sea- 
sonally adjusted or to the choice of monetary aggregate, MI or M2. 
One needs to appreciate fully the important implication of  the exogeneity 
of bank  loans together with their high explanatory power for real variables. 
Bank loans are important not only because monetary policy affects real vari- 
ables through loans. They also have been under the more direct influence of 
the  BOJ-hence  the  exogeneity.  The BOJ  uses  both  instruments-the  call 
rate and window guidance-to  affect real variables. 
1.3  Conclusions 
In its daily operations, the BOJ’s policy target has been the call rate. It has 
never targeted bank reserves. The call rate has been much more stable than the 
federal funds rate even for periods during which the Fed targeted  the funds 
rate.  Because  of  this,  the  stock  of  high-powered  money  is  an endogenous 
variable. 
The BOJ stabilizes the call rate by using “defensive” operations extensively, 
which accommodate movements in the shortage or surplus of funds. Although 
the BOJ also fully accommodates changes in the demand for bank reserves at 
the  monthly  level,  it carries  out “dynamic” operations  at the daily level to 
change the target level of the call rate. Changes in BOJ lending at the discount 
window are an important instrument for this purpose. 
The possibility of more direct control of the call rate by the BOJ has also 
been pointed out. In some periods the BOJ quoted the call rate either directly 
or indirectly, at the same time preventing arbitrage between markets through 
moral suasion. The importance of such non-market-oriented control of the call 28  KazuoUeda 
rate  and the  change in  its  importance  over time need  to be  more carefully 
studied. 
Bank loans play an important role in the transmission of monetary policy in 
Japan. I find stronger support for the credit view in Japan than in the United 
States. The interpretation of this finding, however, involves more than merely 
pointing out that monetary policy affects the real sector through its effects on 
bank loans. 
The call rate is not the  best  indicator of  monetary policy  in the sense of 
being the best predictor of real-sector activity in the economy. Monetary ag- 
gregates and loans also predict real variables fairly well.  However, the call 
rate and bank lending cause other monetary indicators in the Granger sense. 
This is plausible,  because  the BOJ  uses  window  guidance  to control bank 
lending directly during times of monetary tightening. 
Abstracting from daily operations, we may say that the call rate and bank 
lending are the instruments of monetary policy  in Japan.” Changes in these 
will create changes in other interest  rates  and monetary aggregates,  in turn 
moving real variables. 
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